INTRODUCTION
It is often argued that the absence of arbitrage guarantees that the equilibrium market price of any asset will equal its fundamental value, defined as the appropriately discounted present value of the asset's future dividends. For a finite-dimensional economy, this is implied by the doi:10.1006Âjeth.1999.2589, available online at http:ÂÂwww.idealibrary.com on Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, which asserts the equivalence between the absence of arbitrage, the existence of a probability measure under which every asset's discounted price is a martingale, and the existence of an optimum for a hypothetical agent who prefers more to less. For certain infinite-dimensional economies, this version of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing does not hold, suggesting that equilibrium prices in these economies may deviate from their fundamental values; i.e., equilibrium prices may have bubbles.
2 For discrete-time, infinite-horizon economies, the possibility that bubbles can exist has been extensively studied; see, for example, [2, 9, 13, 17, 23, 32, 36] .
We study rational asset-pricing bubbles in a finite-horizon continuoustrading economy in which agents face wealth constraints.
3 Wealth constraints will be important for ruling out arbitrage opportunities in the form of doubling strategies, which are essentially sequences of bets that win for sure in finite time by doubling up after a loss. A model of continuous trade in which agents prefer more to less requires some assumption to make doubling strategies infeasible, for otherwise there can be no equilibrium. Wealth constraints are effective in ruling out doubling strategies [11, 15] , but they still allow suicide strategies, which throw away wealth for sure by essentially running a doubling strategy in reverse. Suicide strategies are sometimes regarded as economically irrelevant because an agent who prefers more to less would never choose a suicide strategy as part of an optimal plan. What we show in this paper is that asset prices themselves may contain suicide strategies in the form of bubbles asset prices can be decomposed into a fundamental value and a suicide strategy and they will be economically relevant because agents cannot exploit the apparent arbitrage given a wealth constraint.
The continuous-trade economy is a rich new environment for studying bubbles and yields several new economic insights. The fact that assetpricing bubbles can exist in continuous-trade economies has not been previously studied partly because of a misconception that some notion of the absence of arbitrage should imply the existence of a equivalent change of probability that makes every discounted asset price a martingale, a result which would rule out all asset-pricing bubbles. However, in a continuoustrade economy with wealth constraints, a price system can represent a potential equilibrium and hence will be arbitrage-free even if no such change of measure exists. Moreover, wealth constraints can drive a wedge
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2 See [6, 12, 31] for the finite-dimensional analysis. That this exact form of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing may not hold in infinite-dimensional economies is discussed in [1, 8, 14, 24, 26, 33] , and many others.
between the market price of an asset and the amount of initial wealth needed to replicate the payouts of an asset. In particular, our results demonstrate that some standard asset-pricing techniques, such as computing replicating costs or using risk-neutral measures, can provide misleading conclusions for economies in which wealth constraints are important.
Our results typically apply to one of two types of assets, either those in positive net supply or those in zero net supply. For assets in positive net supply, we present several conditions (some of which are new) that rule out bubbles on equilibrium prices of these assets under varying assumptions about market completeness and wealth constraints. As Santos and Woodford [32] do for discrete-time economies, we conclude that absence of bubbles for assets in positive net supply is fairly robust to various economic assumptions. However, we will point out several fundamental economic differences between our conditions and those currently in the literature.
For assets in zero net supply, there are no theoretical conditions that rule out asset-pricing bubbles. These bubbles share some characteristics of their discrete-time counterparts, but they also have some unique properties. For example, continuous-time bubbles can burst with probability one by any deterministic time prior to the end of trade, and they may be uniformly bounded across states of nature. 4 These properties are important because they permit assets with bounded prices and finite lifespans, like bonds and put option contracts, to have bubbles. This suggests that asset-pricing bubbles on zero net supply assets may be more ubiquitous and more difficult to detect in empirical data than has been previously thought, and that obtaining clear econometric restrictions from this class of models may be difficult given the resultant wide-ranging price indeterminacy. Our results suggest that some of the current intuition about bubbles follows more from the common mathematical framework of existing models than from pure economics.
In our study of asset-pricing bubbles, we use probabilistic techniques from martingale theory. Using these techniques helps us to simplify some of our analysis and proofs; indeed, we use them to present a new necessary and sufficient condition for the absence of bubbles on positive net supply assets for general wealth constraints and possibly incomplete markets. We conjecture that these techniques could be used to develop analogs of some of our results for the discrete-time case and to make the proofs of some existing results more transparent.
We state our main assumptions in Section 2 and our notion of equilibrium in Section 3. Section 4 presents our main results for complete markets and a particular choice of wealth constraint, and Section 5 presents our results for markets that are possibly incomplete and for general wealth constraints. In Section 6, we present examples that highlight the importance of our assumptions, and the Appendix contains our proofs.
THE MODEL

Primitives
We consider an economy in which all economic activity takes place on a finite time interval [0, T] or [0, T ). (We do not formally treat the case where T is infinite, but with minor modifications our analysis would include this case.) Economic uncertainty is described by a probability space (0, F, P), on which is defined a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion Z. Information arrival is represented by a filtration [F t ] t # [0, T] , which we take to be the filtration generated by the Brownian motion Z and augmented by all P-nullsets. This model is standard for many applications in financial economics.
The economy contains I individuals, each of whom is completely described by preferences over intermediate and terminal consumption, private endowments, and initial endowments of securities. For a given agent i, an intermediate consumption plan
is admissible if it is nonnegative, progressively measurable, and finite almost surely, meaning that c i (t, |)< almost surely on [0, T )_0. Cumulative consumption at time t is given by t 0 c i (s) ds. A terminal consumption plan C i is admissible if it is F T -measurable and if it is P-almost surely nonnegative and finite.
Preferences for intermediate and terminal consumption for agent i are represented by a real-valued utility function U i (c, C). Although we always assume that agents prefer more consumption to less, we sometimes interpret this in different ways. Each of our results will apply one of three cases: that in which (i) preferences are strictly increasing only in intermediate consumption (i.e., U i is monotonic only in its first argument), (ii) preferences are strictly increasing only in terminal consumption (i.e., U i is monotonic only in its second argument), or (iii) preferences are strictly increasing in both intermediate and terminal consumption (i.e., U i is monotonic in both arguments). We make the standard assumption that agents are indifferent to consumption plans that are almost everywhere identical.
In our general analysis, we permit but do not require U i to have additional properties such as convexity, concavity, continuity, and the like. We sometimes assume that preferences have the von Neumann Morgenstern representation
where the functions u i : R + _[0, T ) Ä R and V i : R + Ä R are almost surely continuous. Depending on whether u i , V i , or both are nontrivial, preferences will be strictly monotonic only over intermediate consumption, strictly monotonic only over terminal consumption, or strictly monotonic over both types of consumption.
Each agent i receives a finite nonnegative rate of private endowment e i (t) over the time interval [0, T ) and a finite nonnegative private terminal endowment = i at time T. The corresponding cumulative endowment process is
where 1 [t=T] (t) denotes the indicator function which equals 1 when t=T and equals zero otherwise. The process e i (t) is assumed to be progressively measurable, and = i is assumed to be F T -measurable. To avoid unnecessary complications, we assume that when preferences are monotonic only over intermediate consumption, then = i equals zero, and when preferences are monotonic only over terminal consumption, then e i equals zero. Agents also receive initial security endowments, which are described in the next section.
Remark 2.1. We sometimes ignore the superscript i when we refer to a particular agent if there is no ambiguity.
The Financial Market
The asset market consists of K+1 securities. The first security represents locally riskless borrowing and lending. Its price B represents the value of a unit investment in the asset from time 0 to t. We assume that B is a continuous predictable finite variation process with B(0)=1. Each agent is endowed with :Ä i units of the riskless asset, and we assume that
The remaining k=1, ..., K assets are risky and represent claims to risky dividend flows. The cumulative dividend process D k for a given risky asset k is described by
where $ k is a finite nonnegative adapted process. The corresponding gains process G k is given by the continuous semimartingale
where S k (t) denotes the nonnegative and adapted price of the ith risky security at time t. We interpret S k (T ) as the liquidating dividend, and we assume that it is finite and nonnegative. We sometimes use the discounted gains process G , which is defined by
To simplify notation, we use the vector notation
T , and
T to denote the gains processes, the risky asset prices, and the cumulative dividends, respectively. (Superscript T denotes transpose.)
Each agent i is initially endowed with ?Ä Agents manage their asset portfolio continuously through time to finance consumption. Agent i 's wealth at time t is given by
where
and : i are adapted R k -valued and R-valued processes, respectively. Portfolio strategies are assumed to be self-financing, meaning that
and
is the market value of individual i 's initial securities endowments.
To ensure that trading gains are well defined, we require admissible trading strategies to be progressively measurable and to satisfy conditions that make gains from trade well defined as stochastic integrals. These conditions are standard integrability restrictions assumed in models of continuous trade. In the notation of [28, Chap. IV], we require each agent to choose strategies from the set L(B, G).
VIABILITY AND EQUILIBRIUM
We focus only on prices that represent potential models of competitive equilibrium, so we now develop the structure necessary to identify such prices. We first describe the consumption and investment choice problem for a given agent. In general, we assume each agent i must honor a wealth constraint described by
where L i is a finite and progressively measurable process. We interpret (5) as a constraint that a monitor, possibly a regulatory agency or other trading partners, could enforce given rational expectations about prices and endowments. In particular, L i may depend on equilibrium prices and future endowments, but it may not depend on consumption plans or trading strategies. Later we sometimes make special assumptions about L i . Here is the choice problem for agent i. 
, and the wealth constraint (5).
A price system for which there exists a solution to Problem 1 for some hypothetical agent who takes prices as given is viable (in the sense of [14] ) as a model of economic equilibrium. Properties of viable price systems are important because they tell us what our economic models predict for asset pricing and consumption-investment behavior.
Under additional assumptions we will make, the wealth constraint (5) has the dual role of enforcing market clearing and making doubling strategies infeasible. While there are other constraints that sometimes make doubling strategies infeasible (e.g., short-sales constraints, a restriction to simple strategies, L p -integrability restrictions), we study a class of constraints that includes (but is not limited to) those which (i) are implementable in the sense described above, (ii) do not introduce market imperfections beyond that of making doubling strategies infeasible, and (iii) are well defined for all the potential models of equilibrium we consider.
To determine whether a price system is viable, we need to define an appropriate notion of arbitrage given our assumptions. Here is the definition we will use. We denote by l the Lebesque measure on [0, T]. The economic spirit of arbitrage is that it is inconsistent with viability because adding it as a net trade to any feasible consumption plan improves utility and continues to be feasible. As stressed in [26] , remaining within this spirit requires an arbitrage strategy to maintain nonnegative wealth when agents face wealth constraints like (5), for otherwise adding an arbitrage as a net trade to some consumption plans will be infeasible. Our notion of arbitrage is the appropriate one given our assumptions about choice because it is equivalent to the existence of an optimum for a hypothetical agent who prefers more to less (see [26] ).
We always work with prices that are arbitrage-free; however, this by itself is a very weak restriction for continuous-trade models. For example, Loewenstein and Willard [26] show that a price system may be arbitragefree even if there is no reasonable sense in which state prices are positive. In this paper, we focus only on equilibria with positive state prices, so we make the following additional assumption. Assumption 3.3.1. Assume there exists a local martingale M with M(0)=1 such that, for each k=1, ..., K, the deflated price process defined by
is a local martingale. 5 Moreover, assume that the corresponding process \ defined by
is positive (i) on [0, T ) if agents' preferences are monotonic only over intermediate consumption or (ii) on [0, T] if agents' preferences are monotonic over terminal consumption.
Conditions on preferences that would justify Assumption 3.3.1 as a consequence of optimality are given in [26] . We call \ a state-price representation if it has these properties. Unlike the familiar state-price density in financial economics, a state-price representation is not generally a density because it may not correspond to any equivalent change of probability. A state-price representation will be a state-price density if and only if M is a positive martingale on [0, T], in which case E[M(T )]=1. However, since M is generally a nonnegative local martingale, it is a supermartingale and E[M(t)] 1 for all t. When M fails to be a martingale, it must be that
, so in some sense state prices are quite large on a small probability set. One of our purposes in this paper is to study the economic significance of this fact (see in particular Section 4.6).
We now need a definition of equilibrium. For this, we denote the aggregate intermediate and terminal endowments by e(t)= : 
respectively. Note that these include net claims to dividends. 
, and :
These conditions are understood to hold almost everywhere in the appropriate sense.
BUBBLES IN COMPLETE MARKETS EQUILIBRIA
We begin by taking as given a complete markets equilibrium and assuming a particular form of the wealth constraint (5). While not all of our results in this section depend on these assumptions, making them here helps to clarify the economics of bubbles in continuous-trade economies while avoiding the extra notation and structure needed for studying more general economies. We study topics specific to incomplete markets and general wealth constraints in Section 5.
Complete Markets Equilibria
We first define what we mean by a complete markets equilibrium. Let (S, B) be a viable price system, and let M be a local martingale positive on [0, T ) that makes deflated prices (6) a local martingale. By Ito's lemma, the corresponding discounted gains process G in (2) has the representation
for some real-valued process + k and some R d -valued process _ k . We now make a complete-markets assumption that says that the
T spans R d at almost every time t. This condition is often used to guarantee that a given admissible consumption plan is financed by an admissible trading strategy, a result which we formalize later. Recall that l denotes the Lebesgue measure on [0, T].
Next, we make an assumption about the form of the wealth constraint (5) . In this section. we always assume that L i is given by
The first component of L i reflects the present value of future endowments, possibly permitting the agent to borrow against future anticipated income. The second component permits additional borrowing if X i >0 or restricts borrowing against anticipated future income if X i <0. This constraint can be enforced by a monitor who has rational expectations about future endowments and equilibrium prices.
To make this constraint effective, we assume that the value of agents' endowments are finite in the following sense. 
Our first lemma demonstrates that a state-price representation is useful for defining a static form of an agent's budget constraint in that a stateprice representation is a stochastic discount factor (or pricing kernel) for future consumption.
Lemma 4.1. Let \ be a given state-price representation for an economy in which Assumption 4.4.2 holds. Suppose that each agent i must honor the wealth constraint (5) with L i given by (8) . Then any admissible consumption and investment plan (c i , C i , ? i , : i ) satisfying the dynamic budget constraint (4) also satisfies the static budget constraint
The key feature of this static budget constraint is that it is nonlinear when X i is nonzero and E[M(T )]<1. As discussed in [26] and in Proposition 4.3, when X i is positive, the constant part provides a measure of the value of a limited arbitrage opportunity taken to its maximum scale given the wealth constraint. An agent with access to credit will always use a limited arbitrage opportunity as part of an optimal strategy, and the constant X i (1&E[M(T )]) reflects the resulting higher effective wealth available to the agent. However, these limited arbitrages require negative wealth, and``arbitraging'' them away will not be possible given a wealth constraint. When X i is negative, the constant provides a measure of the reverse of this limited arbitrage, or a suicide strategy, which the agent would be forced to hold in the presence of a bubble on the riskless asset (see Example 6.3).
Remark 4.1. While in this section we are assuming at markets are complete and hence that the state-price representation is unique. Lemma 4.1 also applies to incomplete markets with multiple state-price representations. In the latter case, inequality (9) would hold for every state-price representation, a fact we use in our later analysis of general markets.
Our next result, which follows directly from Lemma 4.1, shows that there are no arbitrage opportunities or doubling strategies. We now show that any state-price representation can be used to construct an equilibrium for a single agent economy with carefully chosen endowments.
Lemma 4.3. Let (S, B) be a price system for which there exists a state-price representation \. Assume that \ is strictly positive on [0, T ) and that Assumptions 3.3.1, 4.4.1, and 4.4.2 hold. Then we can choose a hypothetical agent who prefers more to less and appropriate endowments so that (S, B) represent equilibrium prices in an economy populated only by this agent.
This result is important because it says that, given our assumptions about wealth constraints, assuming existence of a state-price representation implies the existence of some economy which supports this choice as a competitive equilibrium. For this reason, we simply work with a given state-price representation for the remainder of this section.
Complete-Markets Asset-Pricing Bubbles
We now present a precise definition of an asset-pricing bubble in our setting. Our definition is consistent with the traditional definition of an asset-pricing bubble used, for example, in [9, 23, 32, 36] . 6 Recall that the deflated risky asset prices in (6) are nonnegative local martingales, and because of this they are also supermartingales [21, Problem 1.5.19] . This implies that
which says that the current price of the risky asset k must be at least as large as its expected present value of its future dividends.
What is important about inequality (10) is that it may be strict. Thus we can think of the asset price as being composed of two parts: on [0, T ), there is a fundamental value given by
, and a bubble component given by
If inequality (10) is strict at some time t<T, then we say that asset k's price has a bubble. 7 A bubble therefore represents the amount by which the equilibrium price of an asset exceeds the present value of its payouts.
CONTINUOUS-TIME ASSET-PRICING BUBBLES
We can also define a bubble on the price of the riskless asset in a similar fashion. This bubble, which we denote by b 0 , is given on [0, T ) by
and b 0 (T )=0. A bubble exists on the riskless asset if and only if M is a local martingale that is not a martingale. Note also that having a bubble on the riskless asset is a necessary condition for the constant part of the pricing rule defined in (9) to be nonzero. We now present some examples of continuous-time bubbles.
Examples of Asset-Pricing Bubbles
This section contains several examples of asset-pricing bubbles which are consistent with the existence of equilibrium when agents must honor wealth constraints. We begin by presenting an example of a local martingale that is not a martingale that will be useful in later examples and some proofs.
Example 4.1. Let s be some deterministic time in the interval (0, T], and let Z be a one-dimensional Brownian motion. Let +, r, and _ be positive constants with +>r, and define the process ' s by Here is our first example of an equilibrium asset-pricing bubble. In this example, we use the local martingale ' s to put a bubble on the price of a redundant security.
Example 4.2. Consider an economy that consists of a riskless asset B and two risky assets with prices denoted by S 1 and S 2 . The risky assets pay no intermediate dividends, and the market is dynamically complete when trading is restricted to the assets B and S 1 . Let \ be a state-price representation that makes \S 1 a martingale (which implies that b 1 (t)#0). Suppose that S 2 equals
where ' s is the local martingale defined in (11) with 0<s T. Then S 1 and S 2 pay the same dividends, and \S 2 is a local martingale. Thus \ is also a state-price representation for the price system (B, S 1 , S 2 ), and there is a bubble on the price of the second risky security since b 2 (t)=' s (t)Â\(t).
In Example 4.2, S 2 represents a tracking portfolio which mimics the payouts of S 1 . Because \ is a state-price representation for the price system (B, S 1 , S 2 ), we see that having a bubble on S 2 is consistent with the existence of equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, an agent would like to sell short S 2 to fund purchases of S 1 , but cannot do so at an arbitrary scale without violating a finite wealth constraint.
We now provide an example of a bubble on the riskless asset.
Example 4.3. Suppose that B(t)=exp(rt) for some nonnegative constant r and that there is also a single risky asset paying no intermediate dividends. Suppose that the risky asset's price has the representation dSÂS=+ dt+_(T&t) 3Â2 dZ(t), where + and _ are constants. The local price of risk, %, is given by
, and the local martingale M, defined by M(t)=' T (t), is positive on [0, T ) and makes the corresponding discounted gains process a local martingale. Hence the price system is arbitrage-free. In this example, M(T ) equals zero almost surely, so the entire price of the riskless asset consists of a bubble; i.e., b 0 (t)=B(t).
In Example 4.3, \ is a state-price representation for (B, S) even though \(T )=0. In [26] , we show that a price system with this property is viable for a class of preferences which includes those monotonic only over intermediate consumption.
General Properties of Finitely Lived Asset-Pricing Bubbles
Here are some general properties of continuous-time asset-pricing bubbles.
Proposition 4.1. Let (B, S) be a viable price system, and let \ be a state-price representation. Assume \(T ) is positive almost surely. Then the following are properties of any equilibrium asset-pricing bubble (including those on the riskless asset):
1. A bubble is almost everywhere nonnegative, and it is almost everywhere equal to zero after the time at which it first hits zero. Moreover, it is possible for a bubble to burst with probability one by any deterministic time in (0, T].
2.
A bubble b k is identically equal to zero if \b k is dominated by a Class D stochastic process. 8 In particular, this implies that the condition
holds over any interval [t, T] on which b k is nonzero with positive probability.
3. The following inequality holds for any bubble b k :
4. It is possible for a bubble to be uniformly bounded across paths, even if it is a bubble on a risky asset.
Note we do not assume that markets are complete in Proposition 4.1, so its conclusions also hold for bubbles in incomplete markets. (However, we will need to slightly modify our definition of a bubble for incomplete markets in Section 5.) The first statement implies that a bubble cannot start after the initial trading date and that a bubble cannot restart after it has burst (i.e., after it has hit zero). These are well-known properties of assetpricing bubbles in the discrete-time infinite-horizon literature (see, e.g., [9] ).
The second part of the statement is important because it tells us that even assets with finite maturities, such as many derivative securities, can have bubbles. Example 4.2 provides an example in which the bubble can burst at any time s prior to the end of the trading horizon. This is our first indication that continuous-time bubbles are different from discrete-time ones since a standard backwards induction argument shows that discretetime bubbles cannot burst by a deterministic date prior to the end of the trading horizon.
At first glance, this result may not seem surprising, for one can simply remap an infinite horizon economy into a finite horizon economy (e.g., count each period n as 2 &n decades) to obtain an economy in which a bubble bursts for sure in finite time. However, our result is different because the trading horizon is fixed: given a fixed trading horizon of length T, a 32 LOEWENSTEIN 
4]).
The second statement of Proposition 4.1 tells us something about the explosiveness of an asset-pricing bubble. For example, one implication is that we cannot uniformly bound \b k by a constant over its remaining life unless b k =0 over that interval. What is important is that the value of the bubble is large relative to the state-price representation, which can be thought of as representing agents' intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. Loosely speaking, a bubble must either be very large when state prices are very low, or it must be sufficiently large when state prices are very high. However, inequality (12) tells us that, while \b k must be large, the probability of observing a path along which it becomes large is small. This is an analog of the statement in [9] that a bubble is``empirically plausible only if... the probability is small that a bubble would become arbitrarily large.''
The final statement is also about the difference between bubbles in discrete-time and continuous-trade economies. For example, it is often argued that assets with known price limits (e.g., bonds or put options) cannot have bubbles, because otherwise the prices would violate these bounds with positive probability. This is not true when continuous trade is permitted. Later we present an example of a bounded bubble and identify a sufficient condition for all bubbles to be unbounded.
Bubbles on the Prices of Risky Assets
We want to determine whether there exist assumptions about the primitives of the economy that rule out equilibrium asset-pricing bubbles. Our first result along this line is a positive one, saying that, given complete markets and the form of the wealth constraints we are assuming, there cannot exist bubbles on assets in positive net supply if agents are allowed to borrow at least up to the present value of their endowments.
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CONTINUOUS-TIME ASSET-PRICING BUBBLES 9 The difference is highlighted by the following example. Let [s n ] be any (possibly infinite) increasing sequence of times in (0, T ), and let [b n ] be a sequence of bubbles defined as in Example 4.2 such that b n k bursts deterministically at time s n and n b n k (0)< . Then, for a given redundant asset k in zero net supply with fundamental value f k , the market price f k + n b n k will also be an equilibrium price in many cases (as we show later in this section), but there is no simple mapping from a discrete-time economy that would produce such a bubble.
there cannot be any bubbles on any risky asset in positive net supply.
Theorem 4.1 follows from the intuition that bubbles cannot have aggregate wealth effects if agents' wealth constraints are sufficiently loose. Note that Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 imply that in a complete market each optimizing agent chooses consumption plans so that (9) holds with equality; i.e.,
Summing over all agents and using the market clearing conditions (7a), we get
Because ?Ä 0, inequality (10) implies that the left-hand side of (14) is nonpositive, but the right-hand side must also be nonnegative because each X i is nonnegative and E[M(T )] 1. Thus having an equilibrium implies that both sides must equal zero; in particular, whenever ?Ä k >0, we have
Because each deflated price process (6) is a nonnegative local martingale, equality (15) implies that each deflated price must be a martingale for an asset k in positive net supply [21, Exercise 1.3.25]; hence, b k (t)#0 for all such assets. For assets in zero net supply, we may be unable to rule out rational asset-pricing bubbles. Our next result shows that sometimes bubbles can be added or deleted from the prices of these assets without causing wealth effects. Thus there is a sense of price indeterminacy for assets in zero net supply. 
From (13), we see that adding bubbles in the manner of Example 4.2 or deleting bubbles by substituting fundamental values in place of an original asset does not have wealth effects on any asset k for which ?Ä i k =0 for each agent i. If investment opportunities do not change, then agents choose the same consumption allocations regardless of whether an asset in zero net supply has a bubble. In Section 6, we present an example in which deleting a bubble changes the span of the market and, consequently, adversely affects the Pareto optimality of the equilibrium.
Derivatives are important examples of assets held in zero net supply. The traditional approach of derivative pricing is to set it equal to what its noarbitrage price would be if it were introduced as a redundant asset in zero net supply. Our next result shows that a no-arbitrage price may include a bubble, and it may be nonunique.
Corollary 4.2. Given a complete-markets equilibrium, we can add redundant (derivative) securities in zero net supply at prices that either do or do not include bubbles. Moreover, for some economies, trade in these securities can be nontrivial even if there is a bubble.
A common argument against bubbles on redundant assets is that agents would not trade these assets because there, would exist a feasible trading strategy that seems superior. However, this is not the case here because the wealth constraint makes superior strategies infeasible. Another argument against bubbles on redundant assets is that agents would be able to arbitrage these bubbles away. Corollary 4.2 indicates that both of these arguments are flawed. Trade in these securities can be nontrivial because they are redundant: adding redundant securities with or without bubbles may introduce an indeterminacy in equilibrium trading strategies but not in equilibrium consumption allocations. Intuitively, an agent can generate a fixed payout using many different feasible strategies given a redundant security, and market clearing will be preserved since counterparties can offset this agent's positions using appropriate feasible replicating strategies.
For economies like ours, Corollary 4.2 is also a negative result for the traditional technique of pricing derivative securities using a risk-neutral measure or a stochastic discount factor. When agents must honor wealth constraints, prices of derivative securities are essentially indeterminate in this class of continuous-time economies, and naive applications of these techniques to actual markets where wealth constraints are important might generate inaccurate conclusions. Justification for using these pricing techniques must come from outside this standard competitive continuous-time model.
Bubbles on the Price of the Riskless Asset
We now state some special properties of bubbles on the riskless asset. Proposition 4.3. Let (B, S) be a viable price system, and let \=MÂB be the corresponding state-price representation. The following are properties of bubbles on the riskless asset:
A bubble on the price of the riskless asset exists if and only if E[M(T )]<1.
There cannot be a bubble on the riskless asset if \ is a state-price density.
2. Any bubble on the riskless asset is bounded by the price of the riskless asset. In particular, if B is bounded, then any bubble on its price is bounded.
There is a bubble on the riskless asset if and only if there exists an admissible trading strategy that (i) requires no endowment (W
i (0)=0, e i #0, = i #0), (ii) provides positive consumption ((c i , C i ){(0, 0
)), and (iii) requires a finite amount of negative discounted wealth with positive probability (P((\t # [0, T]) W(t) 0)<1 and P((\t # [0, T]) W(t)ÂB(t) &#)=1 for some constant #>0).
The first statement follows from the definition of b 0 and from the fact that a supermartingale M with E[M(T )]=1 is a martingale [21, Problem 1.3.25]. The existence of a state-price density would imply the existence of an equivalent change of probability measure with density M(T ) dP. (However, it is important to note that it would not guarantee an equivalent change of probability under which every discounted asset price is a martingale (i.e., there might not exist an equivalent martingale measure) because other assets in zero net supply might have bubbles under the change of measure; see Proposition 4.2 and Corollary 4.2.) Note that the absence of bubbles on the riskless asset is not a sufficient condition for \ to be a state-price density. The second statement follows from the definition of b 0 .
The admissible trading strategy described in the third statement is called a free snack in [26] , and its existence follows from Lemma 4.2. Although a free snack costs nothing and provides profit with no chance of loss, it is not an arbitrage because it requires negative wealth. A wealth contraint like (5) prevents an agent from holding an arbitrarily large position in such strategies; hence, their existence can be compatible with equilibrium. Our next result describes to what extent free snacks may be included in equilibrium trading strategies. Corollary 4.3. Assume that X i 0 for all i=1, ..., I. If there is a bubble on the risk-free asset, then the existence of equilibrium requires X i =0 for all i. Moreover if X i >0, then the existence of equilibrium requires E[M(T )]=1, and there would be no bubble on the risk-free asset. Corollary 4.3 captures the intuition that an agent i can take a long position in a free snack only if there is a second agent j who is forced to take the offsetting position. From the second agent's perspective, this is a suicide strategy and would be inconsistent with optimality if X j 0. Thus if X i is nonnegative for each agent i, then agents cannot undertake free snacks in equilibrium. More precisely the result follows from the fact that both sides of inequality (14) must be zero in equilibrium and that a bubble on the riskless asset exists only if E[M(T )]<1. Proposition 4.3 says that a bubble on the riskless asset is bounded if the bond price is bounded. We now show that a bubble on the riskless asset can induce bounded bubbles on risky assets. 
Because B is bounded, b 2 is bounded.
The intuition of Example 4.4 can be used to construct more elaborate examples; for instance, Loewenstein and Willard [26] use put-call parity to construct a bounded bubble on a put option. However, as our next result shows, bounded bubbles are primarily related to bubbles on the riskless asset.
Proposition 4.4. Let \ be a state-price representation positive on [0, T], and assume that there are no bubbles on the riskless asset. Then any discounted equilibrium asset-pricing bubble b k ÂB cannot be uniformly bounded from above. In particular if B is bounded below away from zero, then b k itself cannot be uniformly bounded from above. Proposition 4.4 states an analog of the familiar result that an asset-pricing bubble must have a growth rate higher than that of the locally riskless asset [37] ; however, Example 4.4 illustrates that our assumption that there are no bubbles on the riskless asset is important for this result.
Here is the intuition of Proposition 4.4. First, the absence of bubbles on the riskless asset and a strictly positive state-price representation imply that there exists an equivalent change of measure Q with Radon Nikodym derivative dQÂdP=M(T ). Second, we have E[dQÂdP | F t ]=M(t), and because \b K is a local martingale under the probability measure P, the process b k ÂB is a local martingale under Q [28] . Thus if b k ÂB is dominated by a process that is Class D under Q (e.g., a uniformly bounded process), then b k ÂB must be a martingale with constant expectation [29, Proposition IV. 1.7] . Since b k ÂB is nonnegative and b k (T )ÂB(T )=0 almost surely, this is possible only if b k #0. Hence b k ÂB cannot be uniformly bounded under these assumptions, and b k itself cannot be uniformly bounded if 1ÂB is bounded above.
The following proposition gives a sufficient condition for ruling out the possibility of a bubble on the price of the riskless asset. In Propositions 4.4 and 4.5, we make assumptions about B that should be determined in equilibrium. We now identify a class of economies for which B will be bounded above and below away from zero in equilibrium.
Corollary 4.4. Assume that the aggregate endowment e satisfies de(t)=+ e (t) dt+_ e (t) dZ(t) (16) for some bounded predictable processes + e and _ e , and assume that e satisfies 0<$ e(t) 2 for some positive constants $ and 2. Suppose also that all agents' preferences are state independent and satisfy the conditions of Proposition 4.5. Then there is no bubble on the riskless asset, and any bubble on a zero net supply asset cannot be uniformly bounded.
These assumptions about preferences hold, for example, if the preferences are of the HARA class. The assumption that + e and _ e are bounded processes is used to put a uniform bound on the equilibrium interest rate, and it can be relaxed somewhat.
BUBBLES IN EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
The preceding results apply to complete markets equilibria in which each wealth constraint (5) has the special form (8) . In general, however, whether or not an asset market is complete is determined in equilibrium (not by assumption), and we may be interested in other types of borrowing constraints. In this section, we study equilibrium asset-pricing bubbles when markets are possibly incomplete or agents face general borrowing constraints.
Incomplete Markets Equilibria
We first address a complication for defining a notion of asset-pricing bubbles in incomplete markets. Our definition of equilibrium, presented in Definition 3.2, remains appropriate for the incomplete markets case, as does the choice problem given in Problem 1. However, the defining feature of an incomplete market is that there exist infinitely many state-price representations in an arbitrage-free market.
Because of this, the appropriately discounted present value of future dividends is ambiguous, since it depends on the state-price representation used in calculating it. Moreover, the absence of bubbles might also be ambiguous, because prices might have bubbles relative to one state-price representation and no bubbles relative to another. It is generally not possible to rule out the existence of such bubbles with respect to an arbitrary state-price representation; however, in some cases, we can prove that there exists some state-price representation relative to which there are no bubbles on assets in positive net supply. We present results along this line after we develop some more notation.
Let K be the set of state-price representations implied by a given price system. 10 For a given state-price representation \ # K and a given asset k, we associate a fundamental value f \ k relative to \ by
CONTINUOUS-TIME ASSET-PRICING BUBBLES and a bubble component relative to \, which is given by
The dependence of f \ k and b \ k on \ indicates their dependence on the given state-price representation. If markets were known to be complete, then K would be a singleton and the fundamental and bubble values would be unambiguous and would equal the values defined in our complete markets analysis.
Nonexistence of Bubbles on Positive Net Supply Assets
Recall that the general form of agents' wealth constraints are given by
(We have repeated (5) here for convenience.) In this section, we leave L i unspecified to learn more about the interaction between wealth constraints and the existence of bubbles. However, we need enough structure to ensure that the wealth constraints at least make doubling strategies infeasible.
(Recall that there is no hope of equilibrium when agents prefer more to less if there is a feasible doubling strategy.) We also assume a finite value of the aggregate endowment to ensure that
Here is the assumption we use.
Assumption 5.5.1. For a given state-price representation \ # K, the collateral value L i ensures that the process
is uniformly integrable from below and for all admissible trading and consumption strategies. Moreover, the value of the aggregate endowment is finite relative to \:
In this section, we will always work with Assumption 5.5.1. It is important to note that wealth constraints are still important for our results in this section through our assumption, even though they do not appear directly.
Our next result says that, under Assumption 5.5.1, each feasible discounted wealth process is a supermartingale and that, by implication, doubling strategies are infeasible.
Lemma 5.1. Let \ # K be a given state-price representation for which Assumption 5.5.1 holds. For any admissible consumption plan (c i , C i ) financed by a trading strategy satisfying the dynamic budget equation (4), the discounted wealth process in (17) is a supermartingale, and the following inequality holds:
In particular, no arbitrage opportunities exist (even if P(\(T )=0)>0), and there are no feasible doubling strategies.
Lemma 5.1 is an analog of Lemma 4.1 for possibly incomplete markets. Note that wealth may not satisfy Assumption 5.5.1 if X i >0 when L i has the form given in (8) .
Here is our main result for this section.
Theorem 5.1. In a given equilibrium, let [W i : i=1, ..., I] denote agents' optimal wealth processes, and let \ # K be a given state-price representation such that Assumption 5.5.1 holds. Then there are no bubbles on assets in positive net supply relative to \ if and only if each agent's discounted optimal wealth process (17) is a Class D martingale.
Theorem 5.1 says that whether agents' discounted wealth processes are additionally martingales at an optimum is the key for determining whether we can rule out bubbles relative to a given system of state prices. It also provides a necessary and sufficient condition for ruling out bubbles that applies to either complete-or incomplete-markets equilibria, and it does not depend on the exact form of the wealth constraints (provided that Assumption 5.5.1 holds). In Section 6.3, we present an example that helps to illustrate the intuition of Theorem 5.1.
Our next result is useful for showing a relation between absence of bubbles and a statement about the equilibrium allocations.
Corollary 5.1. In a given equilibrium, suppose that for each agent i there exists a state-price representation \ i # K such that
is a Class D martingale. Additionally assume that there exists a positive constant # and some j # [1, ..., I] such that
Then there are no bubbles on assets in positive net supply relative to the state-price representation \ j .
Condition (19) places a lower bound on the ratio
If, for instance, each agent i 's preferences have a von Neumann Morgenstern representation (1) in which (19) indicates that there are no bubbles on assets in positive net supply relative to \ j . This equilibrium allocation is not wildly different from a Pareto-optimal allocation in the sense that one agent cannot optimally consume a large amount while another agent optimally consumes very little.
11 The assumption of Corollary 5.1 often holds whenever wealth constraints are specified so that they do not bind in equilibrium, but this is not necessary. See [17] for a related result for a discrete-time economy with no uncertainty.
One may suspect a finite supremum value of aggregate endowment over all state-price representations implies the absence of bubbles on positive net supply assets for some state-price representation. This is true, for example, in discrete-time economies [32, Theorem 3.1], but our next result suggests that it may not hold for continuous-trade economies.
Corollary 5.2. Suppose that there exists some admissible trading strategy that finances an admissible consumption plan (c, C) with the following properties: (c, C) dominates some positive fraction of the net dividends; i.e., there exists some #>0 such that c(t) #?Ä $(t) and C #?Ä S(T ) hold almost surely, and the supremum value of the (c, C) is attained by some state-price representation \*; i.e.,
Then there are no bubbles on assets in positive net supply relative to \*.
The primary difference between the discrete-time result of [32] and our Corollary 5.2 is that we additionally need to assume that the supremum value of some dominating consumption plan is attained by some state-price representation.
LOEWENSTEIN AND WILLARD
11 In this case, \ i would be related to the minimax equivalent martingale measure of [15] and [7] (except that there is not necessarily an equivalent martingale measure here) and the results of [20] .
ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES
This section contains examples highlighting the role of some of our assumptions.
Wealth Effects Caused by Introducing Bubbles
An assumption of Proposition 4.2 is that each agent's initial endowment of the assets is nonnegative. As this example illustrates, this assumption is important because otherwise introducing bubbles can have wealth effects. There are two important conclusions from the example: (i) in some circumstances, there can be indeterminacy not only in asset prices but also in equilibrium (Pareto optimal) allocations, and (ii) there can be a transfer of wealth from an agent initially endowed with a short position in an asset with a bubble (e.g., the issuer with asset) to those with positive endowments of the asset, because the former agent may sometimes need to trade out of the short position to maintain a wealth constraint.
Suppose that there are two agents in the economy, each with von Neumann Morgenstern preferences (1) described by u i (c)=log(c) and
. The aggregate endowment is described by
where + and _ are positive constants. As specified below, each agent will receive a specified constant fraction of this intermediate endowment and no terminal endowment. Each agent i must maintain a wealth constraint for which L i has the form (8) with X i =0; i.e., each agent is allowed to borrow only up to the present value of his share of the aggregate endowment. The asset market consists of a risky asset and a riskless bond, each of which is in zero net supply. The risky asset pays intermediate dividends $(t)=e(t) and no terminal dividend. The price of the riskless bond is described by
Each agent's initial endowment of the bond equals zero. Case 6.1 serves as basis for later comparison.
Case 6.1. Suppose that each agent has endowments e i (t)= 1 2 e(t). Then the state-price representation is \(t)=1Âe(t), and each agent consumes one half of the aggregate endowment. Equilibrium asset prices are
In Case 6.1, the equilibrium price of the risky asset does not have a bubble. In our next case, we show that the equilibrium is unchanged if we modify the initial endowments so that they include some shares of the risky asset.
Case 6.2. Suppose that the first agent has a private endowment of e 1 (t)= 1 4 e(t) and is endowed with 1 4 shares of the risky asset. Suppose that the second agent has a private endowment of e 2 (t)= (21) and (22) are also equilibrium prices here, and each agent again consumes one half of the aggregate endowment.
In Case 6.2, agents' consumption allocations are unchanged because reallocating the endowments has no wealth effects. We can see this through the agents' static budget equations, which are given by
Because these are the same as their counterparts in Case 6.1, the agents choose the same consumption plans as before, and equilibrium asset prices do not change.
In the next case, we show that agents' consumption allocations may not be independent of their endowments when the equilibrium price of the risky asset includes a bubble. For this, we will need to define new equilibrium asset prices that include a bubble. We do this in the same manner described in the proof of Proposition 4.2: we define the new risky asset prices S by
where ' T is defined in Example 4.1, # # [0, 2T] is a constant, and S is given by (21) . We take the bond price to be that in (22) . We now illustrate that adding the bubble causes wealth effects.
Case 6.3. Assume the same initial endowments as in Case 6.2. The price system defined using (S , B) is an equilibrium price system, and the agents' static budget equations are given by
If there is no bubble (i.e., if #=0), then the agents' optimal consumption is the same as in Cases 6.1 and 6.2. If # # (0, 2T ), then Agent 1 acquires more wealth at the expense of Agent 2. If #=2T, then Agent 1 possesses all of the wealth in the economy. Equilibrium consumption is described by c 1 (t)=(1+#Â2T ) e(t)Â2 and c 2 (t)=e(t)&c 1 (t).
Note that in Case 3 the consumption allocations are Pareto optimal, even though there is an asset-pricing bubble.
Bubbles and Asset Span
We now present an example to show (i) that adding or deleting an assetpricing bubble can affect the span of a asset market, (ii) that trade in an asset can be nontrivial even if it has a bubble, and (iii) that deleting a bubble on an asset (even if it is zero net supply) can make equilibrium allocations Pareto inefficient. The example complements Proposition 4.2, which says that adding or deleting bubbles has no consequence on equilibrium allocations if the market remains complete after doing so and if changing asset prices has no wealth effects.
In this example, a two-dimensional standard Brownian motion Z= (Z 1 , Z 2 ) represents uncertainty. Suppose that there are two agents (i=1, 2) with von Neumann Morgenstern preferences (1) described by u i (c, t)= log(c) and V i (C) # 0. Each agent's endowment is given by e i (t) = 1Â(2M 0 (t) M i (t)), where
We assume that the processes # 1 and # 2 are progressively measurable, differ on a set of l_P-positive measure, and make M 1 and M 2 bounded above and bounded away from zero almost surely. We additionally assume that each # i is measurable with respect to the augmented filtration generated by Z 2 . Each agent i must maintain a wealth constraint in which L i is given by (8) with X i =0.
Example 6.1. Let \ be defined by
Consider the following three assets in zero net supply. The first asset is locally riskless with price
where r is given by d\=&r\ dt+_ \ \ dZ (explicit representations for r and _ \ can be calculated using Ito's lemma). The second asset is a risky asset paying only a terminal dividend with price
The final asset is also risky, pays no dividends, and has price
where ' T is defined as in Example 4.1 (where we substitute Z 2 for Z). Then these are equilibrium prices that make markets complete over intermediate consumption, and corresponding equilibrium consumption is given by c 1 (t)=e(t)Â* and c 2 (t)=(*&1) e(t)Â*, where
In particular, the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
In this example, the price of the second asset is a pure bubble; i.e., b 2 (t)#S 2 (t). The fact that the second asset has a bubble is what completes the market. We remark that the \ defined above is the state-price representation for this market. If we were to delete the bubble from this asset, its price would identically equal zero because it pays no dividends. Our next example shows that deleting the bubble affects equilibrium allocations by changing the span of the asset market.
Example 6.2. Consider the same dividend structure assumed in the previous example, but now take the corresponding prices to be
and S 2 (t)#0. These are equilibrium prices for an economy in which markets are incomplete over intermediate consumption and in which c 1 (t)=e 1 (t) and c 2 (t)=e 2 (t). In particular, no trade takes place, there are no asset-pricing bubbles, and the equilibrium allocation is not Pareto optimal.
This example suggests others in which bubbles can help to complete the market. For example, in an incomplete market, one might be able to introduce derivative securities on existing assets at prices that include bubbles that depend on uncertainty not spanned by the primitive assets. In this case, bubbles would help to improve the Pareto efficiency of equilibrium allocations and would improve the hedging opportunities of market participants.
Bubble on a Positive Net Supply Asset
Theorem 5.1 suggests circumstances under which a bubble might exist on an asset in positive net supply in a complete-markets economy. Our next example identifies such a circumstance.
Example 6.3. Assume that there are two agents for whom u i #0 and V i (C)=log(C). Assume that B#1 and that there is a single risky asset with price
where X is a strictly negative real number and \ is a strictly positive local martingale with \(0)=1 and \(T )=S &1 (T ). Note that E[ \(T )]<1 by assumption, and the market will be complete under reasonable assumptions about S(T ).
Each agent is endowed with one share of the risky asset and receives no private endowments. Also suppose that each agent must observe the wealth constraint
(This says that each agent must maintain a lower bound on wealth that is strictly positive (because X is negative); i.e., L i <0) Neither agent trades in equilibrium, and each consumes the terminal payout S(T ). The value of the aggregate endowment is finite, markets clear, and the allocation is Pareto optimal. However, the risky asset's price has a bubble, even though it is in positive net supply.
To see that holding the stock is optimal for the agents in Example 6.3, observe that
holds with equality when agent i 's wealth process satisfies W i (T )=S(T ) (the inequality comes from Lemma 4.1). The existence of the bubble is consistent with Theorem 5.1 because deflated wealth is a true supermartingale and not a martingale. (The conclusion of Theorem 4.1 does not hold here because in the example we assume that each X i is non-negative.) In essence, the wealth constraint in the example forces each agent to hold the bubble as a suicide strategy in equilibrium.
CONCLUSION
We have studied conditions under which rational asset-pricing bubbles may or may not exist for a popular class of continuous-time economies. One implication of our results is that a complete theory of asset pricing for continuous-trade economies with wealth constraints requires a complete understanding of how securities originate and how agents coordinate on prices, especially given the degree of price indeterminacy for assets in zero net supply that our results suggest. These issues are not addressed by standard competitive equilibrium models, and conclusions drawn from them about actual economies in which wealth constraints are important may be misleading or false. Including more complex features, such as differential information or limited rationality, only worsens the problem (see, e.g., [35] ), and will not help us to understand the fundamental features of these continuous-trade economies. Although we have studied a particular version of the continuous-trade model, it should be clear that the techniques apply to more general economies, including, e.g., those with different models of uncertainty, discontinuous information arrival, and overlapping generations.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Recall that \=MÂB for some local martingale M. We first claim that the process N, defined by
is a local martingale for each admissible consumption-investment strategy.
(Recall that we sometimes drop the superscript i when there is no ambiguity.) We shall prove this in a moment, but for now we accept this and continue with our proof. By assumption, N and M are both local martingales, so there exists an increasing sequence of stopping times { n Ä T almost surely such that
for each n. By assumption, W satisfies (5) with L i given by (8) , so 
Moreover, the monotone convergence theorem [3, Corollary 4.2.2] yields
Then inequality (9) follows directly from (A.2), since
Our proof will be finished after we verify our claim that N is a local martingale. Consider any admissible consumption-investment plan (c, C). Because \ is a state-price representation, we know that Y, defined by
is a local martingale. Integrating by parts yields
(Here ( } , } ) denotes quadratic covariation.) Again integrating by parts and using the self-financing condition (4), we also have
we may write 
Define the process W (t) by
We set the actual wealth process W equal to
W(t)=W (t)&XB(t). (A.4)
We now show that this choice of W satisfies the wealth constraint (5) . Note that 
+X(E[M(T ) | F t ]&M(t)).
That W satisfies (5) now follows from the nonnegativity of M, C, and c. Finally, we must show that there is an admissible portfolio trading strategy that finances W. For this, we make the claim that N, which is defined in (A.1) for an arbitrary consumption plan (c, C), satisfies This is the required trading strategy.
We now prove our claim that N satisfies (A.5). First, note that in Lemma 4.1, we showed that N satisfies (A.3), and we work with that representation. Second, define the discounted dividend process D by for some constant *, so \ is bounded above by some constant a*. By definition,
\(t) b 0 (t) a*B(t).
By Proposition 4.1, b 0 must be zero if B is a Class D process. K Proof of Corollary 4.4. We claim that B is bounded above and away from zero under these assumptions. (Hence 1ÂB will be trivially Class D.) Given this, then our proof follows immediately from proofs of Propositions 4.1, 4.4, and 4.5.
We now prove our claim. First, we note that because markets are complete, the first welfare theorem holds, so we can find weights # i such that the optimal consumption plans c i solve the representative agent problem U(e, t)= max (See, e.g., [10] or [18] ). Now note that \(t)=#U e (e, t) for a constant # and that the price of the riskless asset is given by We now prove necessity. Suppose that there exists a state-price representation \ relative to which there exist no equilibrium pricing bubbles on any asset k for which ?Ä k >0. From the supermartingale property of \(t) W(t)+ t 0 \(s)(c i (s)&e i (s)) ds, inequality (18) must hold at each agent's optimum. Summing over all agents and using market clearing conditions (7a) and (7b), we find that 
